Tor Browser is often described as \u201cFirefox routed through Tor,\u201d but that description is incomplete.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Its design is based on a broader security model in which the browser engine, Tor client, browser profile, anti-fingerprinting protections, privacy defaults, update mechanism, and runtime data are treated as parts of one controlled environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That design has several practical consequences on Linux. Installation differs from conventional browsers, profile handling is less flexible than Chromium-based browsers, and creating multiple isolated environments can result in multiple complete Tor Browser installations rather than several lightweight profiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This article explains how that architecture works on Arch Linux and why Tor Browser is designed this way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The standard Arch Linux approach is to install Then start it with:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A crucial detail is that It installs the launcher:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The launcher then performs several tasks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The actual Tor Browser installation is normally placed somewhere under:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A typical structure looks like:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This distinction matters because The package installed through Arch Linux is best understood as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The actual browser is downloaded separately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This explains why a command such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n shows launcher-related files, while the Tor Browser executable itself lives in the user data directory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The browser engine is located inside the downloaded bundle, for example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Tor client bundled with Tor Browser is typically located under:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those files are not conventional Arch package payloads installed directly by Arch Linux also provides a package called:<\/p>\n\n\n\n That package installs the standalone Tor daemon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is useful for purposes such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not required merely to use Tor Browser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser already carries the Tor client required for its own network connection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The distinction is therefore:<\/p>\n\n\n\n versus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chromium-based browsers generally use a very flexible application-data model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This allows one installed browser executable to use many independent data directories:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The browser program and browser data are clearly separated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser follows a different model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its Linux distribution is closer to a self-contained application bundle<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n That bundle contains not only a Firefox-derived browser, but also:<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words, Tor Browser is designed more like:<\/p>\n\n\n\n rather than simply:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser is not intended to be equivalent to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its security model depends on controlling multiple layers simultaneously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A website can potentially observe information such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even when the user’s IP address is hidden, an unusual combination of these properties may contribute to browser fingerprinting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser therefore attempts to make users resemble larger groups of other Tor Browser users.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The goal is not simply to hide the IP address.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The goal is also to reduce uniqueness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor routing protects the network path:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The destination normally sees the Tor exit relay rather than the client’s original public IP address.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, consider a browser with:<\/p>\n\n\n\n That browser could potentially remain recognizable across multiple sessions even if its exit IP changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is why Tor Browser treats browser configuration as part of its anonymity system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Simply configuring an ordinary browser to use a Tor SOCKS proxy does not reproduce the entire Tor Browser security model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Window dimensions can contribute to browser fingerprinting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser therefore standardizes content dimensions and uses a mechanism commonly known as letterboxing<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead of exposing arbitrary content dimensions directly, Tor Browser attempts to place users into standardized size groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This can produce visible margins around webpage content when a window is resized or maximized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That behavior is deliberate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A conventional browser may prioritize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser may prioritize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those goals are not always identical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This also explains why Tor Browser may reopen using a standardized window size instead of always reproducing the previous desktop geometry exactly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Tor Browser profile typically exists inside the browser bundle:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor runtime data exists nearby:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This creates a structure such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is fundamentally different from the Chromium model:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Firefox internally supports profile mechanisms, but Tor Browser does not emphasize arbitrary profile switching as a primary operating model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its tested security assumptions are built around a known Tor Browser environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Linux applications commonly use XDG environment variables such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n An alternate Tor Browser environment can therefore be created by launching For example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The script can simply be named:<\/p>\n\n\n\n or:<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is no technical reason for filenames or directories to describe the intended browsing purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A neutral directory layout might be:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This naming convention has an additional privacy benefit: filesystem names do not reveal unnecessary contextual information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Changing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n does not tell Tor Browser:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Create another Firefox profile.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It tells Use a different application-data environment.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The launcher then looks for Tor Browser under the new data directory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If no installation exists there, it concludes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The expected result is therefore:<\/p>\n\n\n\n After installation, a layout may resemble:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a second complete Tor Browser environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not merely a second profile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The architectural difference can be summarized clearly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is lightweight and convenient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This consumes more disk space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the security boundary is simpler to understand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Each environment can be treated as one independent unit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An isolated launcher environment may contain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Processes such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n may also appear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These are related to cryptographic verification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser releases are distributed together with OpenPGP signatures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The launcher therefore performs something conceptually similar to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The GnuPG environment is therefore part of the software-supply-chain verification process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not browser-history data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An isolated Tor Browser environment can contain many files immediately after initialization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The directory contains far more than browser history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It may contain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The actual profile may contain files such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n SQLite databases may also temporarily create:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor itself maintains runtime information under its own data directory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore:<\/p>\n\n\n\n does not imply:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Much of the storage is simply the application bundle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser deliberately minimizes persistent browsing state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A useful conceptual distinction is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bookmarks are a good example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A session can disappear while deliberately saved bookmarks remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This implements a useful data-minimization principle:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Persistent storage should favor intentionally retained information rather than automatically preserving every browsing event.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n That reduces the amount of historical behavior available from local browser data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Privacy is not only about network traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also about stored information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Suppose one browser profile retains:<\/p>\n\n\n\n while another retains only:<\/p>\n\n\n\n If both directories are later copied, inspected, or exposed, the second environment reveals much less historical activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This illustrates a general security principle:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Network anonymity and local data minimization therefore solve different problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Each Tor Browser instance normally launches its own Tor process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Typical local interfaces include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n If two independent Tor Browser environments are launched simultaneously, both may attempt to use the same local ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The result can be:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This may look like a browser failure, but the cause can simply be:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Useful diagnostics include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n and:<\/p>\n\n\n\n If simultaneous execution is unnecessary, the simplest solution is to allow one Tor Browser environment to exit completely before launching another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser has a counterintuitive property:<\/p>\n\n\n\n More customization is not always more secure.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A conventional browser may be heavily personalized:<\/p>\n\n\n\n In an anonymity-oriented browser, every unusual property can potentially contribute to uniqueness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser therefore benefits from standardization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The safer general principle is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n rather than:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A highly customized Tor Browser may become easier to distinguish from the larger Tor Browser population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Directory and script names can reveal context unnecessarily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, names describing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n provide information that the software itself does not require.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Neutral naming is preferable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Good examples include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n and scripts such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The filesystem should reveal only what is operationally necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This principle applies beyond Tor Browser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Neutral names are useful for:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Operational clarity does not require descriptive personal context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most useful way to understand Tor Browser is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This explains many of its architectural choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It distributes a complete browser bundle because the browser itself is part of the security model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It carries its own Tor client because Tor configuration is part of the expected environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It standardizes browser behavior because fingerprint uniqueness matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It minimizes persistent state because local history can also become a privacy risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It verifies downloads because software-distribution integrity is essential to the entire security chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A neutral Linux organization can look like:<\/p>\n\n\n\n If another isolated Tor Browser environment is needed, a separate XDG root can be created:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Each environment remains understandable without embedding personal meaning in filesystem names.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser initially feels unusual to users accustomed to Chromium’s flexible The difference reflects different priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chromium is primarily a general-purpose browser platform with flexible profile management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser is a standardized anonymity environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its architecture asks a different question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not:<\/p>\n\n\n\n How easily can arbitrary browser profiles be created?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n But:<\/p>\n\n\n\n How can the browser, network stack, stored state, and observable characteristics remain controlled enough that individual users are harder to distinguish?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Once that principle is understood, many behaviors become logical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A new XDG environment downloads another full Tor Browser because the launcher considers it a separate installation environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The profile lives inside the browser bundle because browser state is part of the security model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Window behavior is standardized because dimensions contribute to fingerprinting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Persistent state is minimized because unnecessary historical data creates unnecessary exposure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And additional disk usage can be an acceptable tradeoff when it produces clear separation between complete browser environments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tor Browser is therefore best understood not merely as a modified Firefox build, but as a deliberately constrained system in which network routing, browser standardization, local-data behavior, cryptographic verification, and isolation are all components of the same security philosophy<\/strong>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Tor Browser is often described as \u201cFirefox routed through Tor,\u201d but that description is incomplete. Its design is based on a broader security model in which the browser engine, Tor client, browser profile, anti-fingerprinting protections, privacy defaults, update mechanism, and runtime data are treated as parts of one controlled environment. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[120],"tags":[219,245],"class_list":["post-6144","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-1s3b6h7r2zay02x","tag-arch-linux","tag-tor"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6144","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6144"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6144\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6145,"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6144\/revisions\/6145"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6144"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6144"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.eternalsphere.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6144"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}torbrowser-launcher<\/code>:<\/p>\n\n\n\nsudo pacman -Syu torbrowser-launcher\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\ntorbrowser-launcher\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\npacman<\/code> does not<\/strong> install the complete Tor Browser bundle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\/usr\/bin\/torbrowser-launcher\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nCheck the current Tor Browser release\n \u2193\nDownload the official archive\n \u2193\nDownload the OpenPGP signature\n \u2193\nVerify the archive\n \u2193\nExtract Tor Browser\n \u2193\nLaunch the browser\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n~\/.local\/share\/torbrowser\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n~\/.local\/share\/torbrowser\/\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 tbb\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 x86_64\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 tor-browser\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\npacman<\/code> manages the launcher package, while the launcher manages the Tor Browser bundle in the user’s data directory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\ntorbrowser-launcher<\/code> Is Not Tor Browser<\/h2>\n\n\n\nDownloader\n+\nSignature verifier\n+\nInstaller\n+\nUpdater\n+\nLauncher\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\npacman -Ql torbrowser-launcher\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n...\/tor-browser\/Browser\/firefox.real\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n...\/tor-browser\/Browser\/TorBrowser\/Tor\/tor\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\npacman<\/code>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Standalone
tor<\/code> Package Is Different<\/h2>\n\n\n\nsudo pacman -S tor\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTor relays\nBridges\nOnion services\nSystem SOCKS proxies\nApplication-level Tor routing\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\ntorbrowser-launcher\n \u2193\nTor Browser bundle\n \u2193\nBundled Tor client\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nArch package: tor\n \u2193\nStandalone Tor daemon\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy Tor Browser Does Not Behave Like Brave or Chromium<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
brave --user-data-dir=\/some\/path\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n\/usr\/bin\/brave\n \u2502\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Profile environment A\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Profile environment B\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 Profile environment C\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\ntor-browser\/\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 start-tor-browser.desktop\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 Browser\/\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 firefox.real\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 browser\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 TorBrowser\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 Data\/\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Browser\/\n \u2502 \u2514\u2500\u2500 profile.default\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 Tor\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTor client\nTor configuration\nBrowser profile\nPrivacy defaults\nAnti-fingerprinting configuration\nBrowser resources\nSecurity-related components\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nBrowser environment\n+\nNetwork environment\n+\nPrivacy environment\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nBrowser executable\n+\nArbitrary profile path\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy Tor Browser Uses a Bundle-Oriented Design<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Firefox\n+\nSOCKS proxy\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nScreen dimensions\nWindow dimensions\nLanguage\nTimezone\nFonts\nGraphics capabilities\nBrowser APIs\nWebGL behavior\nOperating-system characteristics\nBrowser preferences\nExtensions\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nBrowser Fingerprinting and Network Anonymity Are Different Problems<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Client\n \u2193\nEntry relay\n \u2193\nMiddle relay\n \u2193\nExit relay\n \u2193\nDestination\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nRare fonts\n+\nUnusual extensions\n+\nUnique preferences\n+\nDistinctive window size\n+\nRare graphics characteristics\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWindow Size and Letterboxing<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Restore exactly the previous window dimensions\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nReduce fingerprint uniqueness\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Tor Browser Profile Is Part of the Environment<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Browser\/TorBrowser\/Data\/Browser\/profile.default\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nBrowser\/TorBrowser\/Data\/Tor\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTor Browser bundle\n\u2502\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Browser executable\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Browser resources\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Tor binary\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Tor configuration\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Tor runtime data\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 Browser profile\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nSystem browser executable\n \u2193\narbitrary --user-data-dir\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhat Happens When the XDG Data Directory Is Changed<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
XDG_CONFIG_HOME\nXDG_CACHE_HOME\nXDG_DATA_HOME\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\ntorbrowser-launcher<\/code> with different XDG directories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n#!\/bin\/bash\n\nBASE_DIR=\"$(cd -- \"$(dirname -- \"${BASH_SOURCE[0]}\")\" && pwd)\"\n\nexport XDG_CONFIG_HOME=\"$BASE_DIR\/config\"\nexport XDG_CACHE_HOME=\"$BASE_DIR\/cache\"\nexport XDG_DATA_HOME=\"$BASE_DIR\/data\"\n\nmkdir -p \\\n \"$XDG_CONFIG_HOME\" \\\n \"$XDG_CACHE_HOME\" \\\n \"$XDG_DATA_HOME\"\n\nexec \/usr\/bin\/torbrowser-launcher \"$@\"\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nlaunch.sh\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nstart.sh\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n~\/Applications\/TorBrowser-A\/\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 launch.sh\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 config\/\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 cache\/\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 data\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy Changing
XDG_DATA_HOME<\/code> Downloads Another Browser<\/h1>\n\n\n\nXDG_DATA_HOME\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n\n
torbrowser-launcher<\/code>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Tor Browser has not yet been installed in this environment.\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nDownloading Tor Browser for the first time.\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTorBrowser-A\/\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 launch.sh\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 config\/\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 cache\/\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 data\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 torbrowser\/\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 gnupg_homedir\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 tbb\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 x86_64\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 tor-browser\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nChromium Profiles Versus Tor Browser Environments<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Chromium-style model<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
One executable\n \u2502\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Data directory A\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Data directory B\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 Data directory C\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTor Browser-style isolation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Environment A\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Browser\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Tor\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Profile\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 Configuration\n\nEnvironment B\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Browser\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Tor\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Profile\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 Configuration\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy a GnuPG Directory Appears<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
gnupg_homedir\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\ngpg-agent\nscdaemon\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nDownload browser archive\n \u2193\nDownload signature\n \u2193\nVerify publisher signature\n \u2193\nExtract verified archive\n \u2193\nRun browser\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy the Directory Contains Many Files<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Firefox-derived engine\nTor executable\nBrowser resources\nLocalization files\nProfile defaults\nLauncher state\nGnuPG verification data\nTor configuration\nSecurity components\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nplaces.sqlite\nfavicons.sqlite\npermissions.sqlite\nprefs.js\nbookmarkbackups\/\nstorage\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n*.sqlite-wal\n*.sqlite-shm\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nLarge directory\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nLarge browsing-history database\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nPersistent Data and Ephemeral Data<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Automatically generated browsing state\n \u2193\nTemporary\n\nExplicitly selected information\n \u2193\nPersistent\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nData Minimization as a Security Mechanism<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Years of history\nCookies\nSite databases\nSearch records\nSessions\nDownload records\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nConfiguration\nBookmarks\nMinimal persistent state\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nData that was never retained\ncannot later leak from local storage.\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nMultiple Tor Browser Instances and Port Conflicts<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
127.0.0.1:9150\n127.0.0.1:9151\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTor exited during startup\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nInstance A\n \u2193\nalready owns Tor ports\n\nInstance B\n \u2193\ntries to bind the same ports\n \u2193\nfails\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\npgrep -af 'TorBrowser\/Tor\/tor|firefox\\.real'\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nss -lntp | grep -E ':(9150|9151)\\b'\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy Heavy Customization Can Reduce Privacy<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Custom extensions\nCustom fonts\nModified preferences\nSpecial window behavior\nUnusual APIs\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nStay close to Tor Browser defaults\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nModify every possible preference\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nNeutral Naming Is Also Good Operational Practice<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Personal interests\nSecurity intentions\nBrowsing categories\nIdentity roles\nSpecific use cases\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTorBrowser-A\/\nTorBrowser-B\/\nTB-01\/\nBrowserEnv\/\nBrowserSet\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nlaunch.sh\nstart.sh\nrun.sh\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nBackup sets\nVirtual machines\nBrowser profiles\nContainer environments\nSSH configurations\nTest directories\nAutomation scripts\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nTor Browser Is a Security Environment, Not Just a Browser<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Network anonymity\n +\nBrowser anti-fingerprinting\n +\nControlled defaults\n +\nMinimal persistence\n +\nCryptographic verification\n +\nEnvironment isolation\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nA Clean Arch Linux Layout<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
System\n\u2502\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 pacman\n\u2502 \u2514\u2500\u2500 torbrowser-launcher\n\u2502\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 Primary browser\n\u2502 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Normal persistent profile\n\u2502\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 Tor Browser environment\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 launch.sh\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 config\/\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 cache\/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 data\/\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Launcher state\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 GnuPG verification state\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 Tor Browser bundle\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Browser\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Tor\n \u251c\u2500\u2500 Profile\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 Runtime data\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTorBrowser-A\/\nTorBrowser-B\/\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nFinal Perspective<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
--user-data-dir<\/code> model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
\n